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The current interest of states in enforcing their existing antitrust
laws and in enacting new laws is comparable to that of the "trust bust-
ing" era prior to World War I. The impetus of this activity can be
traced to 1957 when the New York State Bar Association conducted a
comprehensive study of the antitrust laws of that state.' The commit-
tee concluded that a genuine need for more effective enforcement of the
New York antitrust laws existed and made several recommendations to
that effect.
Since then the federal government has encouraged the enforcement
of state antitrust laws in a number of ways. In 1960, state antitrust law
enforcement was the principal topic discussed at the National Conference
on Consumer and Investor Protection.? Also, the proposed uniform state
antitrust law has been a product of federal-state cooperation.' The reluc-
tance of some states to actively enforce their existing antitrust laws has
been attributed, in part, to the possible pre-emption and usurpation of
this area by effective congressional legislation.4 Through active federal
encouragement of state enforcement, fear of federal-state conflict appears
to be eliminated.' Hence, there seems to be little reason for the several
states to have misgivings about rejuvenation of long-neglected state anti-
trust laws.
HISTORY OF STATE ACTIvITY
The number of constitutional and statutory prohibitions by states
and territories against trusts and monopolies prior to passage of the Sher-
1. N.Y.S.B.A., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTI-
TRUsT LAWS (1957).
2. See CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 19 (1961); N.Y. Times, March 11, 1960, p. 15,
col. 6 (city ed.), The Wall Street J., Aug. 11, 1960, p. 1, col. 6.
3. See Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary on a Draft
Statute, 39 TExAS L. REv. 717 (1961).
4. For an excellent discussion in the field of possible pre-emption of state law by federal
activity, see Note, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Address of Assistant Attorney General Robert A. Bicks (Head of the Antitrust
Division) and Earl W. Kinter (Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) at Antitrust Con-
ference, Consumer Council Division, Massachusetts At'y Gen., Boston, Oct. 6, 1960, Dept.
of Justice Press Release, Jan. 2, 1961, which summarized the efforts of the Justice Department
in stimulating enforcement of state antitrust laws.
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man Act6 generally is not recognized. Consequently, it is interesting to
note that prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, at least fourteen.
states and territories had antitrust prohibitions in their constitutions,"
and at least thirteen had statutory prohibitions.8 Today all but six states'
have antitrust regulations in their constitutions, statutes, or in both.
The objectives of these state enactments basically have been twofold:
(1) to apply criminal penalties to contracts and agreements in restraint
of trade or commerce, which at common law were merely unenforce-
able; and (2) to prohibit further tactics, such as price cutting and exclu-
sive dealing, which might lead to the formation of monopolies and re-
straints of trade. Despite such objectives, the most frequent result of
the state acts was merely a restatement of the common law with an at-
tempt to define infractions. The infractions, however, while recognized.
at common law to be unethical and unenforceable, were practiced with-
out statutory restraint. 0
Although the antitrust laws of the various states are so radically dif-
ferent that a practice strongly prohibited in one state may not even be-
mentioned in the statutes of another,1 they do cover substantially the-
same activities. The following brief review will indicate the general na-
ture of this legislation.
6. 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
7. ARK CONST. art. II, § 19 (1874); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1818); GA. CONST. art.-
IV, § 2 (1877); IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 18 (1889); Ky. CoNST. § 198 (1850); MD.
CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 41 (1865); MoNr. CONSr. art. XV, § 20 (1889);
N.C. CoNsr. artI, § 31 (1868); N.D. CONST. art. 7, § 146 (1889); S.D. CONST. art. 17, S 20,
(1845); WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22 (1889); Wo. CoNSr. art. I, § 30 (1889). It should
be noted that most of these enactments were concerned primarily with prohibiting land mo-
nopolies in the form of fee tails or colonial charters. Maryland was the first of this group to
specifically mention commerce in connection with monopolies.
8. Since laws of various states have been frequently amended and since codes often omit
the date of passage of a statute, no attempt has been made to list, with full citation, each of
these orginal state enactments. However, see FORKOSC, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER
407-16 (1956) for a list of twenty such early state statutes.
9. Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. 4 TRADE REG. REP.
5J 30201-35585. Maryland, while having no statutory law of general application in this.
area, does have a constitutional provision which states "that monopolies are odious, contrary
to the spirit of a free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suf-
fered." AID. CONST., DEcLARAON OF RIGHTS art. 41. Also, Alaska, when a territory, wa
subject to § 3 of the Sherman Act and 5 1 of the Clayton Act. Since statehood, Alaska has
had an antitrust bill of general application pending in its legislature.
10. In von Kalinowski & Hanson, The California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison With the,
Federal Antitrust Laws, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 533, 535 (1959), it was noted that several recent
California decisions have stated that the Cartwright Act merely articulates in greater detail
the common law covering restraint of trade. See also cases cited p. 535 n.24 of the above-
article.
11. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. § 70-130 to -143 (1947) for a detailed statute against coercion inm
the automobile dealership business, as opposed to forty-seven other states which have no such
provision.
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MONOPOLIES
The extent of state action against "monopolies," as opposed to the
broader concept of "trusts," is largely a matter of statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation. Fourteen states, however, use the word "monop-
oly.' 1
2
The constitutional provisions are more or less sweeping in form and
present a very general statement of the prohibition.'" Many of the
statutes attempt to define monopoly, 4 while others are content to merely
prohibit it.'5
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Only three states - Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico 6
have constitutional prohibitions against restraint of trade. Of these, the
latter two merely direct the legislature to enact laws to prevent contracts,
conspiracies, or combinations in restraint of trade. Twenty-three states
have statutory prohibitions.
Contracts not to compete necessarily are included among restraints
of trade, and statutory enactments concerning such contracts fall into two
basic categories: (1) those which tend to define or restrict the common-
law rule that contracts not to compete are legal between vendor and pur-
chaser or between apprentice and employer if they are reasonable and do
not act as an unfair restraint of trade;' 8 and (2) those which recognize
12. Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 55 30201-35585.
13. Compare MD. CoNsT., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 41, with N.C. CONST. art. I, § 31,
where it is declared that "perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state
and ought not to be allowed."
14. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7427 (1960) which states that a monopoly is "a
combination or consolidation of two or more corporations when effected in either of the fol-
lowing methods: 1. When the direction of the affairs of two or more corporations is in any
manner brought under the same management or control for the purpose of producing, or
where such common management or control tends to create a trust as defined in the first
article of this chapter. 2. Where any corporation acquires the shares or certificates of stock
or bonds, franchise or other rights, or the physical properties or any part thereof, of any other
corporation or corporations, for the purpose of preventing or lessening, or where the effect
of such acquisition tends to affect or lessen competition, whether such acquisition is accom-
plished directly or through the instrumentality of trustees or otherwise."
15. "No person shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine, or conspire with
any other person to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce within this state." LA.
REV. STAT. § 51-123 (1950).
16. LA. CONST. art. 19, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 44; N.M. CONST. art. 4, § 38.
17. Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. 4 TRADE REG.
REP. 5J 30201-35585.
18. For the general common law rule on this type of statute, see United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
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a strong public policy against contracts directed at control of markets
or prices.
The contract not to compete which violates antitrust principles
should be treated differently than the contract limiting the activity of the
apprentice, the retiring partner, or the proprietor selling his business. A
study of the state statutes, however, reveals that states themselves do not
differentiate between the "classical"' 9 contract not to compete and those
contracts which are truly in restraint of commerce. As a result, these
statutes create a broad sweeping prohibition against all forms of restric-
tive covenants. Generally, no exception is made for contracts not in
harmful restraint of trade, e.g., a purchaser attempting to maintain the
good will of a business or an employer attempting to protect a trade
secret.
The following examples will illustrate the haphazard legislative ap-
proach of various states and the influence of particular pressure groups.
New Mexico has a statute prohibiting contracts between railroads not to
compete.2" An Indiana statute specifically prohibits division of territory
by buyers of live stock.21 In Texas, a combination to abstain from
business is a trust22 and, therefore, is prohibited. A North Dakota
statute provides that a seller may agree not to compete so long as the
effect of the contract is limited to the geographical territory of a city,
town, or county.23 South Dakota arbitrarily provides that an employ-
ment contract of this nature is void if the territory exceeds twenty-five
miles.24 Other states prohibit contracts whereby an employee agrees not
to enter a competing business after termination of his current employ-
ment. In these states, all contracts restraining the pursuit of a profes-
sion, trade, or business are void. The acts then enumerate certain ex-
ceptions, but covenants with employees is not listed as one of them.25
POOLING AGREEMENTS
Pooling agreements are prohibited by the constitutions of Kentucky
and Louisiana26 and by statute in seven states.2 7 Only North Dakota,
19. The "classical' contract not to compete is a restrictive covenant in connection with the
sale of a business or employment contract.
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-2-19 (1955).
21. IND. STAT. ANN. § 42-921 (1952).
22. TEx. REV. CV. STAT. art. 7426(7) (1960).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959).
24. S.D. CODE § 10.0706 (1939).
25. See, e.g., Fortnma v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 323 P.2d 146 (1958); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16601; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13-080 to -809 (1955); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1937).
26. KY. CONST. § 198; LA. CONSr. art XIX, § 14.
27. Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, and Utah. 4
TRADE REG. REP. 55 30201-35585.
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however, attempts to define "pooling," and there it is merely a synonym
for "trust."2  The Kentucky and Louisiana Constitutions render pools
illegal where interests are combined to control the prices of articles of
commerce.
Generally, statutory prohibitions follow the form of the Alabama
pooling law. This act prohibits any person or corporation from entering
into a pool "to regulate or fix the price of any article or commodity to be
sold or produced" or "to fix or limit the quantity of any article or com-
modity to be produced, manufactured, mined or sold."29
In some states, only pooling for special purposes is specifically pro-
hibited. Kansas, Montana, and Nebraska ° prohibit combinations of
grain dealers, Mississippi prohibits pools for bidding on public works,3 '
and Washington forbids sales commission pools. 2
PRICE CONTROL
At least half the states have constitutional or statutory provisions pro-
hibiting price-fixing. 3  Most of these states prohibit selling a commodity
at a lower rate in one community than in another. The Kansas statute
is typical. It prohibits combinations of capital, combinations of skill, or
the acts of two or more persons from: (a) increasing or reducing the
price of merchandise, produce, or commodities; (b) controlling insurance
rates; (c) fixing any standard or figure controlling the price of a com-
modity sold to the public; (d) agreeing not to sell, manufacture, or trans-
port a commodity below a common standard figure, or maintain the price
at a standard figure; (e) pooling or combining interests to affect the
price of an article manufactured or transported.34
Several states have adopted the wording of the Robinson-Patman
Act, in prohibiting discrimination within the same locality. Discrimina-
tion "between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quali-
ty" is prohibited in Idaho,35 Oregon, 6 and Utah." Selling "at a lower
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08-02 (1959).
29. ALA. CODE tit. 57, § 106 (1960).
30. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 50-136 (1959); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 94-1115
(1949); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-201 (1943). Nebraska also specifically forbids pools and
pooling agreements in bridge contracting, NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-602 (Supp. 1960), coal deal-
ers, § 59-401 (Supp. 1960), and fire insurance companies, 5 59-301 (Supp. 1960).
31. MIss. CODE ANN. § 1095 (1956).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.050 (1961).
33. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
4 TRADE REG. REP. 55 30201-35585.
34. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-101 (1949).
35. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-202 (1947). See 26 Stat. 732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp.
IV 1963).
36. ORE. REV. STAT. § 646.040 (1955).
37. UTAH CODE ANN. 13-5-3 (1953).
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price or rate to one person. . . than to another" is prohibited in Okla-
homa."8 Discrimination "between persons ...in any locality" is pro-
hibited in Wisconsin.
COMPETITIVE METHODS
In addition to a general prohibition of business tactics designed to
limit competition, restrain trade, etc., a number of the states have pro-
hibited certain specific practices which were designed to secure those
ends. Statutes forbidding local price discrimination are the most com-
mon of such prohibitions. The Massachusetts statute is typical and pro-
vides that no person, firm, association, or corporation dealing in a com-
modity in general use
shall maliciously, or for the purpose of destroying the business of a com-
petitor and of creating a monopoly in any locality, discriminate between
different sections, communities, towns or cities of the commonwealth or
between purchasers by selling such commodity at a lower rate for such
purpose in one section, community, town, or city than is charged for
such commodity by the vendor in another section, community, town or
city in the commonwealth. 40
A general prohibition against restraints on resales appears in statutes
of Idaho, Nebraska, and North Dakota. 1 Exclusive contracts are pro-
hibited by five states: Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Caro-
lina, and Virginia.4" Combinations or agreements to refuse to deal with
persons, firms, etc., also are prohibited by five states: Indiana, Missouri,
Nebraska, South Carolina, and Texas."
PUNISHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Although general similarity to the Sherman Act prevails in several
respects, there is no uniformity among the states in providing criminal
sanctions.44 The acts commonly provide criminal penalties of fines up to
three thousand dollars and imprisonment for maximum periods ranging
from six months to ten years.45
Since no state specifically mentions the general consumer's direct in-
38. OKLA. CONST. art. 9, 5 45.
39. Wis. STAT. § 133.17 (1959).
40. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 93, 5 8 (1957).
41. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-202 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-801 (1943); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 51-09-11 (1959).
42. LA. REV. STAT. § 124 (1950); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 93, 5 1 (1957); MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.51 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 59-22 (1950).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. S 148-1 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.020 (1949); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 59-501 (Supp. 1960); S.C. CODE 66-65 (1952); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 7428
(1960).
44. Approximately three-fourths of the states have provisions similar to the Sherman Act.
(26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).)
45. See, e.g., TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1635 (1953).
1963]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
terest, it is only by granting him standing to sue that the protection of
his rights may be assured. In this light, it is important to note that less
than half of the states statutorily prescribe private damage suits based
upon violations of the antitrust laws.46 Many of these statutes follow
the form of section 4 of the Clayton Act," which provides for the re-
covery of treble damages, court costs, and attorney fees.
State antitrust provisions, generally, are peculiar, and the punish-
ment and enforcement area is no exception. Louisiana, for example,
authorizes only injunctive relief.48 North Carolina provides standing to
sue only "if the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be
broken up, destroyed or injured. . . ."" As a result, the verbiage of dam-
age to property, as opposed to business, is omitted. Oklahoma adds civil
liability to its general criminal penalty section, but only to the extent
that a competitor has suffered loss or injury."
Individuals participating in a corporate violation frequently are cov-
ered by a separate penal section. An unusual Tennessee provision im-
poses joint and several liability upon all persons and corporations that
become members of a prohibited combination. Participants in these
combinations are liable for the debts of every other member as fully as
if all were partners in the creation of such debts."
State attorneys general commonly are charged with the duty of in-
stituting proceedings to restrain the violation of the various acts;52 hence,
46. States which grant permission for a private individual, firm, or corporation to sue are:
California (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. LAws § 11 (1961));
Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-114 (1947)); Indiana (IND. STAT. 5 23-122 (1950));
Iowa (IowA CODE § 553.12 (1962)); Kansas (KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 550-108 (1949));
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. § 51.129 (1950); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 53, 62 § 45
(1954)); Michigan (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.38 (1962)); Mississippi (MSS. CODE ANN.
§ 1092 (1956)); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.090 (1949)); Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. § 59-821 (1943)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 229-8 (1953)); North Caro-
lina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1960)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE § 1331.01)), Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 7 (1951)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE § 66-50 (1952));
South Dakota (S.D. CODE § 37.1913 (1939)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-106
(1955); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-26 (1950)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE
§ 1986.09 (1961)).
47. 38 Star. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). "Any person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
fore ... and shall recover threefold damages by him sustained and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." Ibid.
48. LA. REV. STAT. § 51.129 (1950).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
50. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 7 (1951).
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-105 (1955).
52. The Attorney General has exclusive responsibility in the following states: Arkansas,
Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
and Utah. The district or county attorney has the same exclusive responsibility in Colorado,
Connecticut, Puerto Rico, West Virginia, and Wyoming. In the following states the attorney
general and/or the county attorney may proceed to prosecute: Alabama, Arizona, California
Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Neb-
raska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
[VoL 15:126
